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I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts have recently begun grappling with a new issue in cases 
brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) and 
the Jones Act: what sort of credit, if any, should a jointly and 
severally liable FELA or Jones Act defendant receive for 
settlements that the plaintiff has made with negligent third 
parties?
1
 Although this is a relatively new issue in FELA cases, 
courts have long considered this issue in other areas of federal 
law.
2
 In the seminal 1994 case of McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, the 
United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s recoverable 
damages from a jointly and severally liable maritime defendant 
should be reduced by the proportionate share of damages 
attributable to a settling defendant.
3
 Under this method, the 
nonsettling defendant receives a “settlement credit” (also known as 
a “set-off”) in proportion to the settling defendant’s share of the 
injury, regardless of how much money the plaintiff actually 
recovered from the settling defendant.
4
 The AmClyde Court 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(FELA); Benson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 274 Fed. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(FELA); Lewin v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 389 (N.D. Ohio 2004) 
(Jones Act); Krueger v. Soo Line R.R., No. 02-C-0611, 2005 WL 2234610 (E.D. 
Wis. Sept. 12, 2005) (FELA); Mancini v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08-CV-933, 
2010 WL 2985964 (N.D. N.Y. July 27, 2010) (FELA); Torrejon v. Mobil Oil 
Co., 876 So.2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004) (Jones Act); Palmer v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., 311 S.W. 3d 843 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (FELA); Hess v. Norfolk 
Southern Ry. Co., 835 N.E. 2d 679 (Ohio 2005) (FELA). 
 2. See, e.g., McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994) (adopting 
a proportionate share approach); Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 
1246 (5th Cir. 1979) (adopting a proportionate share approach); Self v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 832 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (adopting a pro 
tanto approach); see also Gus A. Schill, Jr., Recent Developments Regarding 
Maritime Contribution and Indemnity, 51 LA. L. REV. 975, 987 (1991) 
(discussing the history of the set-off debate before AmClyde); W. Robins Brice, 
Solidarity and Contribution in Maritime Claims, 55 LA. L. REV. 799 (1995) 
(discussing the issue in light of AmClyde). 
 3. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 217. 
 4. Id. at 210. 
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favored this set-off rule over the proposed alternative: the “pro 
tanto method,” under which the nonsettling defendant would 
receive a settlement credit for only the amount actually paid by the 
settling defendant, regardless of the level of fault attributable to 
each party.
5
  
To illustrate the way the “pro tanto method” operates (and its 
potential to lead to inequity among defendants), the AmClyde 
Court posed the following hypothetical: 
Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff sues two defendants, 
each equally responsible, and settles with one for $250,000. 
At trial, the non-settling defendant is found liable, and 
plaintiff’s damages are assessed at $1 million. Under the 
pro tanto rule, the nonsettling defendant would be liable for 
75% of the damages ($750,000, which is $1 million minus 
$250,000). The litigating defendant is thus responsible for 
far more than its proportionate share of the damages.
6
  
The possibility of such inequity among defendants was one of 
the many reasons that the AmClyde Court embraced the 
proportionate share rule over the pro tanto method. 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in AmClyde, the 
majority of state and federal courts have adopted the proportionate 
share method, rather than the pro tanto method, in the areas of the 
law that still call for joint and several liability.
7
 But, in recent 
years, an exception has emerged in one area of the law: FELA 
cases
8
 (and shortly thereafter, in Jones Act cases).
9
 This 
development arose in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2003 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. at 208. 
 6. Id. at 212 n.14. 
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 16 
cmt. c (2000); see, e.g., Bragger v. Trinity Capital Enterp. Corp., 30 F.3d 14, 17 
(2d Cir. 1994) (securities litigation); Banks ex rel. Banks v. Yokemick, 177 F. 
Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act); In re 
WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 339 F. Supp. 2d 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(ERISA); see also Martin Davies, McDermott v. AmClyde: The Quiet Achiever, 
39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 11, 12 (2008) (noting the influence of AmClyde in other 
areas of state and federal law, and commenting that “[p]erhaps only Robins Dry 
Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint has had more influence outside of maritime law”). 
 8. See cases cited supra note 1. 
 9. This Article discusses a specific line of cases that have adopted the pro 
tanto approach. Most of these cases are FELA cases. Therefore, the majority of 
this Article discusses the FELA, rather than the Jones Act. However, because 
the Jones Act incorporates the standards of the FELA, see infra Part III.A, the 
FELA cases discussed in this Article will likely have an influence on Jones Act 
claims as well. In fact, this issue has already arisen in two Jones Act cases. See 
Lewin v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 389 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Torrejon v. 
Mobil Oil Co., 876 So.2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004). 
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decision in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, which held 
that a FELA defendant is not entitled to a reduction of damages for 
the negligence of a third party.
10
 Notably, the Court’s decision in 
Ayers did not involve the situation discussed above, in which one 
of the defendants has already settled. Rather, in Ayers, neither the 
FELA defendant nor the allegedly negligent third parties had 
reached a settlement with the plaintiff.
11
 Even so, several lower 
courts have held that the rationale of Ayers requires application of 
the pro tanto set-off rule, rather than AmClyde’s proportionate 
share method.
12
 The most notable of these cases is the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Schadel v. Iowa Interstate Railroad, Ltd., 
which was the first case to address the issue and which has 
subsequently been followed by most other jurisdictions that have 
addressed the issue.
13
 In these cases, courts have applied the pro 
tanto set-off method, requiring FELA defendants to pay more than 
their share of the damages in order to make up for the plaintiff’s 
having settled for too little.
14
  
This Article argues that Schadel and its progeny are incorrect. 
The well-established proportionate share set-off method, 
unanimously adopted by the Supreme Court in AmClyde, should 
determine the amount of credit a FELA defendant receives for the 
settlement of a third party. Schadel was incorrect in holding that 
Ayers requires an abrogation of the AmClyde rule in FELA cases. 
Although Ayers emphasized that joint and several liability is still 
the rule in FELA cases, the opinion said nothing regarding 
settlement credits or the effect of a plaintiff’s settlement with a 
negligent third party. Furthermore, the rationale of Ayers is not 
                                                                                                             
 10. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 165 (2003). 
 11. See id. at 159–66. 
 12. See Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(FELA); Benson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 274 Fed. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(FELA); Lewin v. Am. Exp. Lines, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 389 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (a 
Jones Act case reasoning that the maritime nature of the claim required 
application of AmClyde, not Ayers, but nevertheless applying a pro tanto 
approach on the theory that the calculation of a proportionate share set-off was 
“unreasonable” under the facts of the case); Krueger v. Soo Line R.R., No. 02-
C-0611, 2005 WL 2234610 (E.D. Wis. Sep. 12, 2005) (FELA); Mancini v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., No. 08-CV-933, 2010 WL 2985964 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2010) 
(FELA); Torrejon v. Mobil Oil Co., 876 So.2d 877 (La. Ct. App. 4th 2004) 
(Jones Act); Palmer v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 S.W. 3d 843 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010) (FELA); Hess v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 835 N.E. 2d 679 (Ohio 2005) 
(FELA). But see Palmer v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 S.W.3d 843 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2010) (expressly disagreeing with the above line of cases and holding that a 
nonsettling FELA defendant was not entitled to any set-off for the settlement of 
a negligent third party). 
 13. Schadel, 381 F.3d at 678. 
 14. Id.; see also supra note 12. 
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applicable in settlement scenarios for two reasons: first, as the 
Supreme Court has emphasized, the doctrine of joint and several 
liability exists to protect the plaintiff from outside forces such as a 
defendant’s insolvency, but not from the plaintiff’s own agreement 
to settle.
15
 Second, settlement scenarios change the analysis 
because, unlike the scenario in Ayers, once a negligent third party 
has settled, the FELA defendant will be left without a valid action 
for contribution against the settling third party.
16
 For these reasons, 
this Article argues that courts faced with FELA or Jones Act 
claims should decline to adopt the Schadel approach and should 
instead follow the set-off method that the Supreme Court has 
already prescribed: AmClyde’s proportionate share method.  
Part II of this Article introduces the general rule for calculating 
settlement credits: AmClyde’s proportionate share method. Part III 
discusses Schadel and its progeny and analyzes those cases’ 
application of the pro tanto set-off rule. Part IV argues that 
Schadel and its progeny are incorrect and asserts that courts should 
apply AmClyde’s proportionate share set-off rule in FELA and 
Jones Act cases. 
II. THE GENERAL RULE: THE “PROPORTIONATE SHARE” METHOD OF 
SET-OFF 
For many years, circuit courts and legal commentators 
deliberated over the proper method for calculating a settlement 
credit.
17
 But in 1994 the Supreme Court settled the debate with its 
unanimous decision in the case McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde.
18
 
Although AmClyde was neither a FELA nor Jones Act case, courts 
have adopted its approach as the general rule for calculating 
settlement credits in areas of both state and federal law that still 
                                                                                                             
 15. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 221. 
 16. See infra Part III.C. 
 17. See Leger v. Drilling Well Control, Inc., 592 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1979) 
(adopting a proportionate share approach); Self v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock 
Co., 832 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1987) (adopting a pro tanto approach); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 886A 
(1977) (discussing both the pro tanto and proportionate share methods but 
declining to express a preference for either rule); Daniel Klerman, Settling 
Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of Conditional Setoff Rules, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 445 (1996) (“the conditional pro tanto rule pressures both 
defendants to settle for relatively high amounts”); Lewis A. Kornhauser & 
Richard L. Revesz, Settlements Under Joint and Several Liability, 68 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 427 (1993) (“neither [set-off] rule is consistently better than the other”); 
Schill, supra note 2, at 987 (discussing the history of the set-off debate before 
AmClyde).  
 18. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 221. 
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retain joint and several liability (as do the FELA and Jones Act 
do).
19
 Therefore, this Article will devote considerable attention to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in AmClyde. 
A. McDermott v. AmClyde: The Supreme Court Embraces the 
“Proportionate Share” Method of Set-Off 
AmClyde addressed an accident on an offshore oil platform that 
involved various defendants and several million dollars in 
damages.
20
 While a crane owned by McDermott was lifting a 
prefabricated platform dock, the crane’s main hook malfunctioned. 
A large steel cable sling unraveled, and the platform dock crashed 
down onto its transport barge, causing significant damage. 
McDermott sued AmClyde, the manufacturer of the crane, along 
with the manufacturer of the crane’s hook that broke, and three 
manufacturers of the crane’s steel cable slings (known as the “sling 
defendants”). Prior to trial, the sling defendants settled for $1 
million. At trial, the jury found that McDermott had suffered $2.1 
million in damages, allocating 32% of the fault to AmClyde and 
38% to the manufacturer of the crane’s defective hook.21  
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court faced the 
question of what sort of credit the nonsettling defendants should 
receive for the plaintiff’s settlement with the sling defendants.22 
The Court approached this question with a clean slate, noting 
Congress had not provided any guidance on the issue.
23
 Therefore, 
the Court turned to another source: the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.
24
 As the Court noted, the Restatement did not take a position 
on this issue, but provided three basic options: (1) pro tanto with 
contribution: the nonsettling defendant gets credit only for the 
amount actually paid by the settling defendant, and if the settling 
defendant paid less than his share, the nonsettling defendant may 
seek contribution from the settling defendant; (2) pro tanto without 
contribution: the nonsettling defendant gets credit only for the 
amount actually paid by the settling defendant, and may not seek 
contribution from a settling defendant who paid less than his share; 
and (3) proportionate share: a nonsettling defendant receives credit 
for the settling defendant’s share of liability, regardless of how 
                                                                                                             
 19. See sources cited supra note 7.  
 20. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 205. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 207. 
 23. Id. 
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 
886A (1977). 
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much the settling defendant actually paid.
25
 With these three set-
off rules in mind, the Court weighed the pros and cons of each 
option. 
The Court quickly rejected the first option, pro tanto with 
contribution, reasoning that it was “clearly inferior to the other 
two, because it discourages settlement and leads to unnecessary 
ancillary litigation.”26 The Court noted that it discouraged 
settlements “because settlement can only disadvantage the settling 
defendant”—in other words, a defendant would have nothing to 
gain by settling, because a contribution action by the nonsettling 
defendant could ultimately make the settling defendant liable for 
his full share of the damages anyway.
27
 In addition, “the claim for 
contribution burdens the courts with additional litigation,” the 
Court noted.
28
 
Having dismissed the pro tanto with contribution method, the 
Court turned its attention to the other two set-off options. The 
Court quickly noted that the pro tanto approach would often lead 
to the nonsettling defendant paying more than its equitable share of 
the damages. The Court reasoned that plaintiffs often settle for an 
amount that is “significantly less than the settling defendant’s 
equitable share of the loss, because settlement reflects the 
uncertainty of trial and provides the plaintiff with a ‘war chest’ 
with which to finance the litigation against the remaining 
defendants.”29 And under the pro tanto method, when a plaintiff 
settles for this discounted amount, the nonsettling defendant is left 
to make up for the difference. Such a regime might have the 
beneficial effect of encouraging settlements, but only at the cost of 
wreaking inequity, the Court reasoned.
30
 For that reason, the Court 
concluded that it was “persuaded that the proportionate share 
approach is superior.”31  
After reaching this conclusion, the Court took great pains to 
emphasize that its holding did not abrogate the longstanding rule of 
joint and several liability in admiralty law,
32
 which had recently 
been reaffirmed by the Court’s opinion in Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique.
33
 In Edmonds, the Court refused to 
reduce the judgment against a shipowner by the proportionate fault 
                                                                                                             
 25. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 208–209. 
 26. Id. at 211. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 212. 
 29. Id. at 213. 
 30. Id. at 214–15. 
 31. Id. at 217. 
 32. Id. at 218. 
 33. 443 U.S. 256 (1979). 
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of a stevedore whose liability was limited by the Longshoremen’s 
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). Instead, the 
Court allowed the plaintiff to collect the entirety of his damages 
from the shipowner.
34
 Notably, the AmClyde Court distinguished 
Edmonds based on the fact that “Edmonds did not address the issue 
in this case, the effect of a settlement on nonsettling defendants. 
Indeed, there was no settlement in that case.”35 For this reason, the 
Court held that the rationale of Edmonds did not prevent a 
proportionate share set-off in AmClyde, because Edmonds “merely 
reaffirm[ed] the well-established principle of joint and several 
liability”—and as the Court emphasized “there is no tension 
between joint and several liability and a proportionate share 
approach to settlements.”36  
The AmClyde Court explained that joint and several liability 
requires a defendant to pay more than his share of the damages 
“when the plaintiff’s recovery from other defendants is limited by 
factors beyond the plaintiff’s control, such as a defendant’s 
insolvency.”37 However, the Court held that joint and several 
liability does not impose such burdens on a defendant when “the 
plaintiff’s recovery against the settling defendant has been limited 
not by outside forces, but by its own agreement to settle. There is 
no reason to allocate any shortfall to the other defendants, who 
were not parties to the settlement.”38 The AmClyde Court reasoned 
that the proportionate share method provided the most equitable 
result: just as nonsettling defendants “are not entitled to a reduction 
in liability when the plaintiff negotiates a generous settlement, so 
they are not required to shoulder disproportionate liability when 
the plaintiff negotiates a meager one.”39 
By distinguishing the rationale in Edmonds, the AmClyde Court 
emphasized an important distinction between two different types of 
apportioning fault: first, the type of apportionment that occurs 
when a court divides the damages owed by two or more 
nonsettling defendants at the judgment of a trial (a procedure that 
the Court did not allow in Edmonds); and second, apportionment 
that occurs in the calculation of a proportionate share set-off, 
which gives a nonsettling defendant the appropriate amount of 
credit for the plaintiff’s settlement with a negligent third party (a 
procedure that the Court unanimously embraced in AmClyde).
40
 
                                                                                                             
 34. Id. at 271–73. 
 35. AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 220. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 221. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 220–21. 
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Under the AmClyde Court’s rationale, the doctrine of joint and 
several liability prohibits the former type of apportionment, but not 
the latter. This Article will revisit the distinction between these two 
types of apportionment in Part IV, which provides a critique of the 
Schadel court’s rejection of AmClyde. 
B. AmClyde’s Legacy: the “Proportionate Share” Method Emerges 
as the General Rule of Setoff in Federal Joint and Several Liability 
Cases 
After the Supreme Court issued its ruling in AmClyde, the case 
quickly became a staple of everyday maritime practice.
41
 As one 
maritime expert recently commented, “[w]henever there is a partial 
settlement of a multiparty maritime case, the McDermott rule 
shapes the parties’ behavior, and so it is probably no exaggeration 
to say that McDermott is considered by some practicing lawyer 
somewhere every day.”42  
But, AmClyde’s influence has not been limited to the field of 
admiralty. Rather, AmClyde is routinely cited and applied in other 
areas of federal law that employ joint and several liability, such as 
ERISA, securities fraud, and claims under § 1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act.
43
 And in non-maritime tort claims, the proportionate 
share approach to partial settlement is generally the rule in states 
that still adhere to joint and several liability among tortfeasors, and 
several of those states have arrived at that result by citing and 
applying AmClyde.
44
  
Notably, there is one additional area in which courts have often 
applied AmClyde: Jones Act cases.
45
 At first blush, this might seem 
obvious, given that AmClyde was an admiralty case. But as the 
reader will recall, AmClyde was not a Jones Act case, but a 
property damage case brought under the general maritime law. 
Even so, state and federal courts have routinely applied AmClyde’s 
proportionate share method to seamen’s personal injury claims 
brought under maritime theories such as unseaworthiness, and, 
                                                                                                             
 41. See generally Davies, supra note 7. 
 42. Id. at 12. 
 43. Id.; see also cases cited supra note 7. 
 44. Davies, supra note 7 at 12; see also cases cited supra note 7. 
 45. See, e.g., Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Tanker Robert Watt 
Miller, 92 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 1996); Nunez v. B&B Dredging. Inc., 108 F. 
Supp. 2d 656 (E.D. La. 2000); Slaven v. BP Am. Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1472  (C.D. 
Cal. 1997); Geyer v. USX Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1440 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Miller 
v. Int’l. Diving and Consulting Servs., Inc., 669 So. 2d 1246 (La. Ct. App. 5th 
1996). 
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most relevant to this Article, the Jones Act.
46
 Presumably, courts 
were comfortable adopting AmClyde in maritime personal injury 
cases because Jones Act claims (as well as claims for 
unseaworthiness) are controlled by joint and several liability, just 
like the claims in AmClyde. However, some recent cases have 
broken this trend and applied the pro tanto set-off rule to Jones Act 
claims.
47
 Those decisions followed the Seventh Circuit’s  approach 
in Schadel, a case addressed below. 
III. THE EXCEPTION: FELA AND JONES ACT CASES BEGIN TO 
ADOPT THE ALTERNATIVE “PRO TANTO” METHOD OF SET-OFF 
After the Supreme Court issued its ruling in AmClyde, lower 
courts consistently applied the proportionate share method, rather 
than the pro tanto method, in other areas of federal law that call for 
joint and several liability.
48
 But, in the past few years, a line of 
cases has emerged that has carved out an exception for FELA and 
Jones Act cases.
49
 To explain the emergence of this exception, Part 
III will provide a brief background of the FELA and the Jones Act, 
as well as a discussion of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in 
Norfolk v. Ayers and the Seventh Circuit’s 2004 decision in 
Schadel v. Iowa Interstate Railroad. 
A. FELA (and the Jones Act): A Brief Primer 
A brief background of the FELA is necessary to understand 
why some courts have rejected AmClyde’s proportionate share rule 
in favor of the pro tanto method of set-off. Congress enacted the 
FELA in 1908 as a fault-based statute designed to compensate 
railroad workers who had suffered work-related injuries and to 
“shif[t] part of the ‘human overhead’ of doing business from 
employees to their employers.”50 FELA provides a claim for 
injuries resulting “in whole or in part from the negligence of” the 
railroad.
51
 At the time that the FELA was enacted, workers’ 
compensation laws did not exist for injured employees in other 
                                                                                                             
 46. See cases cited supra note 45. 
 47. See cases cited supra note 12. 
 48. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 49. See cases cited supra note 12. 
 50. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994) (quoting 
Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 58 (1943)); see also Victor E. 
Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Toppling the House of Cards That Flowed From 
an Unsound Supreme Court Decision: End Inadmissibility of Railroad 
Disability Benefits in FELA Cases, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 105, 112 (2003). 
 51. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006). 
2012] SET-OFF RULES IN FELA AND JONES ACT CASES 739 
 
 
 
industries.
52
 Rather, the only method of recovery for injured 
workers was the common law doctrine of negligence.
53
 At the 
time, common law tort principles made recovery by an injured 
employee very difficult, as the doctrines of contributory negligence 
and assumption of the risk often prevented employees from 
prevailing in court.
54
  
Because workers’ compensation laws did not exist at the time, 
Congress crafted the FELA based on common law negligence 
principles.
55
 But, in order to ensure a reasonably reliable 
compensation system, Congress eased recovery for injured railroad 
workers by “(1) doing away with both the fellow-servant rule and 
the doctrine of assumption of risk, and (2) replacing the common 
law principle of contributory negligence as a complete defense 
with a rule of comparative negligence.”56 FELA also retains the 
common law doctrine of joint and several liability, meaning an 
injured worker can recover the entirety of his damages from a 
railroad, even if the worker’s injury was caused jointly by the fault 
of the railroad and a third party.
57
  
So far, this Part has focused on the FELA. But all of the above 
FELA standards apply with equal force to another federal statute: 
the Jones Act. The Jones Act was passed in 1920 to grant injured 
seamen a cause of action against their employers for negligence.
58
 
The Jones Act states that “[l]aws of the United States regulating 
recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee 
apply to an action under this section.”59 In other words, the Jones 
Act grants injured seamen the right to seek damages against their 
employers under the same standards by which the FELA allows 
claims by railroad employees.
60
 Thus, the key features of the 
FELA discussed above—the abolition of traditional common law 
defenses and the retention of joint and several liability—apply with 
equal force under the Jones Act.
61
 This highlights “an important 
                                                                                                             
 52. See Jerry J. Phillips, An Evaluation of the Federal Employers’ Liability 
Act, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 49, 50 (1988); Thomas E. Baker, Why Congress 
Should Repeal the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, 29 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 79, 82 (1992). 
 53. See Phillips, supra note 52, at 50. 
 54. See id.; Baker, supra note 52, at 82; see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2638 (2010).  
 55. See Baker, supra note 52, at 80–82. 
 56. Id. at 82. 
 57. See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 138 (2003). 
 58. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 6-21 (5th 
ed. 2011). 
 59. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104 (West Supp. 2011). 
 60. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 58, at § 6-21. 
 61. Id. 
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lesson for the maritime lawyer: any decision interpreting the FELA 
is a ‘must read’ for the maritime lawyer because of the Jones Act’s 
incorporation of the FELA.”62 
B. Norfolk v. Ayers: The Supreme Court Reaffirms Joint and 
Several Liability for FELA Cases 
One of the Supreme Court’s most recent interpretations of the 
FELA came in its 2003 decision in Norfolk & Western Railway 
Company v. Ayers.
63
 That case is probably best known for its 
holding that mental anguish damages resulting from the fear of 
developing cancer may be available under the FELA by a railroad 
worker who has been exposed to asbestos.
64
 However, relevant to 
this Article, the Ayers Court also addressed a second question: 
when there is evidence that a plaintiff’s injury has non-railroad 
causes, does the FELA permit reasonable apportionment so that the 
railroad is responsible only for those damages attributable to its 
own negligence?
65
 The careful reader will notice that this question, 
presented in Ayers, is distinguishable from the subject of this 
Article in an important way: it mentions nothing about settlement. 
In Part III, this Article will argue that this distinction makes Ayers 
irrelevant to the question of determining proper set-off rules. 
Nevertheless, some courts have recently cited the rationale of 
Ayers as justification for applying the pro tanto method in FELA 
cases. Therefore, a thorough discussion of the Court’s holding in 
Ayers is appropriate. 
In Ayers, six former employees of Norfolk & Western Railway 
who suffered from asbestosis brought FELA claims to recover 
damages they suffered as a result of exposure to asbestos.
66
 At the 
end of trial, Norfolk requested that the court “instruct the jury to 
apportion damages between Norfolk and other employers alleged 
to have contributed to [the plaintiffs’] disease.”67 The trial court 
denied this request and instructed the jury “‘not to make a 
deduction for the contribution of non-railroad exposures,’ so long 
as it found that Norfolk was negligent and that ‘dust exposures at 
[Norfolk] contributed, however slightly, to the plaintiff’s 
injuries.’”68 The jury awarded damages to all six plaintiffs, 
                                                                                                             
 62. FRANK L. MARAIST, THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., & CATHERINE M. 
MARAIST, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MARITIME LAW 488 (2d ed. 2009). 
 63. 538 U.S. 135 (2003). 
 64. Id. at 157–59. 
 65. Id. at 159–60. 
 66. Id. at 140. 
 67. Id. at 143. 
 68. Id. at 144. 
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resulting in a total of $4.9 million owed by Norfolk. The trial court 
denied Norfolk’s motion for a new trial and the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia denied Norfolk’s request for 
discretionary review. 
On appeal before the Supreme Court, Norfolk argued that the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury not to make a deduction 
from the damages award for the contribution of non-railroad 
asbestos exposures. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the 
ruling of the trial court.
69
 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
began by reciting the relevant portion of the FELA: 
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in 
[interstate commerce], shall be liable in damages to any 
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier 
in such commerce . . . for such injury . . . resulting in whole 
or in part from the negligence of . . . such carrier . . . .
70
 
Applying this language, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
“[t]he claimants here suffer from asbestosis (an ‘injury’), which is 
linked to their employment with Norfolk and ‘result[ed] in whole 
or in part from . . . negligence’ by Norfolk. Norfolk is therefore 
‘liable in damages . . .  for such injury.’”71 The Supreme Court 
therefore concluded Norfolk was liable for the entire damages 
award because “[n]othing in the statutory text instructs that the 
amount of damages payable by a liable employer bears reduction 
when the negligence of a third party also contributed in part to the 
injury-in-suit.”72  
The crux of the Court’s reasoning in Ayers was based on the 
FELA’s retention of joint and several liability. The Court went to 
great length to document the fact that “the federal and state 
reporters contain numerous FELA decisions stating that railroad 
employers may be held jointly and severally liable for injuries 
caused in part by the negligence of third parties.”73 Thus, the Court 
reaffirmed that “joint and several liability is the traditional rule [in 
FELA cases]” and concluded that  
[o]nce an employer has been adjudged negligent with 
respect to a given injury, it accords with the FELA’s 
overarching purpose to require the employer to bear the 
burden of identifying other responsible parties and 
                                                                                                             
 69. Id. at 166. 
 70. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006). 
 71. Ayers, 538 U.S. at 160. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 162 (citing numerous state and federal cases). 
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demonstrating that some of the costs of the injury should be 
spread to them.
74
 
As that last quote by the Court suggests, much of the Court’s 
rationale in Ayers hinged on the fact that FELA defendants, if 
found liable to the plaintiff, would possess a right of contribution 
against third party tortfeasors. Citing numerous state and federal 
cases, the Court stressed that “FELA defendants may bring 
indemnification and contribution actions against third parties under 
otherwise applicable state or federal law.”75 The Court also pointed 
out that “FELA defendants may be able to implead third parties 
and thus secure resolution of their contribution actions in the same 
forum as the underlying FELA actions.”76 The Court’s holding in 
Ayers emphasized that a FELA defendant, having been found 
answerable for the entirety of a plaintiff’s injuries, will be given 
the opportunity to “demonstrate[e] that some of the costs of the 
injury should be spread to [third parties].”77 
C. Schadel v. Iowa Interstate Railroad: An Exception to the 
“Proportionate Share” Method Emerges for FELA and Jones Act 
Cases 
In 2004, a little over a year after the Supreme Court decided 
Ayers, the Seventh Circuit issued its ruling in the FELA case 
Schadel v. Iowa Interstate Railroad.
78
 In that case, the Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that the proportionate share method of set-off was 
inconsistent with the purpose of the FELA and the rationale of 
Ayers.
79
 Therefore, the pro tanto method is the proper way to 
calculate set-offs for nonsettling defendants in FELA cases, the 
court held.
80
 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Schadel is notable 
not only for its holding, but for its influence—out of the handful of 
jurisdictions that have addressed the set-off issue in subsequent 
FELA cases, almost all of them have adopted Schadel’s pro tanto 
approach.
81
 Although these cases purport to follow the Supreme 
Court’s rationale in Ayers, Schadel and its progeny represent a 
fundamental misreading of Ayers and a departure from the 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. at 165. 
 75. Id. at 162 (citing numerous state and federal cases). 
 76. Id. at 165 n.23 (citing as examples Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 
349, 350 (9th. Cir 1989); Engvall v. Soo Line R. Co., 632 N.W.2d 560, 563 
(Minn. 2001)). 
 77. Id. at 165. 
 78. See Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 79. Id. at 675–76. 
 80. Id. at 678. 
 81. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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Supreme Court’s well-settled rule espoused in AmClyde.82 For 
these reasons, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Schadel deserves 
considerable attention.  
The facts of Schadel are relatively straightforward. Douglas 
Schadel, a conductor for Iowa Interstate Railroad (IAIS), prepared 
to board an IAIS train that was stopped at a railroad crossing.
83
 All 
of a sudden, a vehicle driven by Brenda Kowalewicz flew toward 
the railroad crossing, crashed through the gates, and struck 
Schadel, propelling him into a nearby ditch.
84
 Schadel suffered 
serious knee injuries and was no longer able to work as a 
conductor.
85
 
Schadel filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois, suing the 
railroad under the FELA and Kowalewicz under state law.
86
 The 
railroad filed cross-claims against Kowalewicz for contribution.
87
 
Before the case went to trial, Schadel settled with Kowalewicz for 
$100,000.
88
 Thereafter, in accordance with state law, the district 
court dismissed Kowalewicz from the case with prejudice, thereby 
extinguishing the railroad’s claims against her for contribution.89  
At the jury trial on Schadel’s FELA claim against the railroad, 
the district court did not allow the railroad to present any evidence 
or argument about the Kowalewicz settlement.
90
 At the end of the 
trial, the court instructed the jury to assign fault only to Schadel or 
the railroad.
91
 The jury found Schadel’s overall damages to be 
$450,000.
92
 It found he was 50% contributorily negligent, which 
reduced his recoverable damages to $225,000. Applying a pro 
tanto set-off method, the court then reduced that number to 
$125,000 to account for the settlement.
93
 Finally, by agreement of 
the parties, the court added another $5,000 to account for a loss of 
consortium claim brought by Mrs. Schadel, resulting in a final total 
of $130,000 due from the railroad.
94
 
On appeal before the Seventh Circuit, the railroad argued that 
the district court erred by applying a pro tanto set-off, contending 
the court should have followed AmClyde and applied a 
                                                                                                             
 82. See infra Part III. 
 83. Schadel, 381 F.3d at 673. 
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proportionate share set-off.
95
 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, 
holding that the proportionate share approach was inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ayers.96 The court started by 
posing a hypothetical to illustrate the effect of applying the 
proportionate fault method: suppose the jury was allowed to 
apportion fault, and found Kowalewicz’s reckless driving was 
responsible for 80% of the damages, the railroad was responsible 
for 10%, and Schadel himself was responsible for 10%.
97
 
“Applying those proportions to the overall figure of $450,000, that 
would mean that Kowalewicz should have paid $360,000; that [the 
railroad] would pay $45,000, and that Schadel would have 
absorbed $45,000 of the loss (for his own negligence) before 
taking the settlement into account.”98 With these numbers in mind, 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that “Schadel would wind up 
substantially under-compensated under this regime, because he 
would also be left [to absorb] $260,000 of Kowalewicz’s liability. 
This strikes us as, at best, in serious tension with the rule of joint 
and several liability that applies to FELA cases.”99  
The Seventh Circuit perceived such tension in spite of the 
Supreme Court’s emphasis in AmClyde that “there is no tension 
between joint and several liability and a proportionate share 
approach to settlements.”100 The Seventh Circuit only briefly 
addressed AmClyde and ultimately held that the case was not 
applicable to FELA claims.
101
 In reaching this conclusion, the 
Seventh Circuit did not discuss the facts or analysis of AmClyde. 
Rather, in a puzzling fashion, the Seventh Circuit cited an earlier 
Supreme Court case, Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique,
102
 as evidence that AmClyde was not controlling 
in FELA cases.
103
 The logic of the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion on 
this point is far from clear and will be discussed in more depth in 
Part IV. In the end, citing the principles of joint and several 
liability and the Supreme Court’s approach in Ayers, the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the pro tanto approach was the correct set-
off rule for FELA cases.
104
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Schadel was the first case to address whether Ayers affected a 
FELA defendant’s right to receive a proportionate share set-off for 
the plaintiff’s settlement with a negligent third party. After the 
Seventh Circuit issued this ruling, several other jurisdictions 
addressed the same issue in subsequent FELA and Jones Act 
cases.
105
 Almost all of these courts, including the Fourth Circuit 
and the Supreme Court of Ohio, have adopted Schadel’s approach 
and applied the pro tanto method.
106
 Because Schadel has become 
the “go to” case on this issue, Schadel is the case to which this 
Article will devote the most attention. 
IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE EXCEPTION FOR FELA AND JONES ACT 
CASES: A CRITIQUE OF SCHADEL 
After the United States Supreme Court embraced the 
proportionate share rule in AmClyde, “the legal system largely 
followed suit,”107 especially in areas of federal law that call for 
joint and several liability.
108
 However, Schadel and its progeny 
declined to follow AmClyde, giving rise to an exception to the 
general rule. Part III provides a critique of that exception. First, 
this Part explains the differences between two distinct concepts: on 
the one hand, the allocation of fault between nonsettling 
defendants; and on the other hand, the calculation of a 
proportionate set-off to give a nonsettling defendant credit for the 
contributions of a settling defendant. Then, this Part will discuss 
the ways the Schadel court conflated these two concepts, resulting 
in a misreading of both AmClyde and Ayers. 
A. “Apportionment of Liability”: One Phrase, Multiple Meanings  
Much of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Schadel focuses on 
the phrase “apportionment of liability.” Because the Supreme 
Court in Ayers held that apportionment of liability was not allowed 
under the FELA, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a proportionate 
share set-off would also be inconsistent with the FELA. This 
rationale by the Seventh Circuit ignored the fact that the Ayers 
holding referred to apportionment in the context of nonsettling 
defendants. Such an oversight is of no small consequence, for 
                                                                                                             
 105. See cases cited supra note 1. 
 106. See, e.g., Benson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 274 Fed. App’x 273 (4th Cir. 
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 107. Michael J. Sturley, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. 
REV. 501, 526 (2010). 
 108. See supra Part II.B. 
746 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
apportionment has drastically different implications in the context 
of calculating a proportionate share set-off. To understand where 
the Schadel court went wrong, it is important to understand the 
distinctions between apportionment among nonsettling defendants, 
and apportionment for purposes of calculating a proportionate 
settlement credit. 
The first example of the “apportionment of liability” occurs in 
the context of comparative negligence, when a fact-finder 
determines the amount of damages owed by each tortfeasor (none of 
whom have settled) by calculating the shares of fault attributable to 
each defendant as well as to the plaintiff.
109
 But this is not the only 
time that a court employs apportionment. The phrase 
“apportionment of liability” is also used in the context of calculating 
settlement credits.
110
 Under AmClyde’s proportionate share method 
of set-off, a court is required to assign the percentages of liability for 
each party. Courts and commentators often use the phrase 
“apportionment of liability” to refer to both of the above 
procedures.
111
 However, in spite of the shared terminology, the two 
procedures have drastically different implications. 
The first of these procedures, apportionment among nonsettling 
tortfeasors, is precisely what the defendant railroad requested in 
Ayers. The railroad requested that the court abandon the rule of joint 
and several liability by requiring an initial allocation of fault among 
third parties who were not before the court (such as prior or 
subsequent employers or asbestos manufacturers or suppliers), such 
that the railroad would be liable only for the portion of damages 
attributable to its employment of the plaintiffs.
112
 The Ayers Court 
rejected the railroad’s request, holding such an approach would 
force the plaintiff to bear the burden of identifying negligent third 
parties.
113
 Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, this is a 
burden the defendant must bear, the Court reasoned.
114
 The need for 
the defendant to carry this burden distinguishes the Ayers scenario 
from settlement scenarios, discussed below.  
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When a court calculates a proportionate share set-off, the court 
applies the fact-finder’s assignment of fault among tortfeasors in 
order to provide a nonsettling defendant with a settlement credit 
proportionate to the fault of a settling tortfeasor. This is the 
procedure the Supreme Court unanimously embraced in 
AmClyde.
115
 Unlike the Ayers scenario above, a proportionate 
share set-off does not violate joint and several liability. The 
Supreme Court made this very clear in AmClyde.
116
 The 
proportionate share set-off does not place a burden on the plaintiff 
to identify negligent third parties. Rather, the plaintiff has already 
recovered from those third parties, and by his own choice has 
extinguished the portion of the liability attributable to those third 
parties. Under the proportionate share rule, the defendant still bears 
the burden of compensating the plaintiff for the portion of injury 
caused by insolvent tortfeasors, but the defendant will not be 
forced to bear the cost of the plaintiff’s own decision to settle for 
too little.  
Keeping the distinctions between these two types of 
apportionment in mind, this Part will now analyze Schadel and 
examine that case’s misreading of Ayers and its misguided 
adoption of the pro tanto rule.  
B. Schadel: Misreading Ayers and Misunderstanding Apportionment  
The Schadel court adopted the pro tanto rule based on an 
inherently flawed reading of both Ayers and AmClyde. The court 
misread Ayers when it reasoned that the Ayers rationale makes 
sense in the context of settlement. And it misread AmClyde when it 
attempted to distinguish that case and the Supreme Court’s earlier 
decision in Edmonds v. Compagnie General Transatlantique.  
Schadel contended that “Ayers, as we have already noted, 
addressed a question very close to the one before us, insofar as it 
dealt with the way that liability could be apportioned under 
[FELA].”117 This statement illustrates one of the biggest flaws in 
the Schadel court’s rationale. The court makes a fatal mistake by 
conflating the two distinct versions of apportionment discussed 
above—apportionment among nonsettling tortfeasors, as rejected 
by Ayers, and the calculation of a proportionate set-off, as 
embraced by AmClyde. The scenario in Schadel clearly involved 
the latter, for the defendant requested that it receive a credit for the 
settlement of the other defendant, and that this credit be calculated 
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 116. Id. at 220–21. 
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in proportion to the settling defendant’s share of the fault.118 As 
explained in the discussion above, although the calculation of such 
a set-off does require apportionment, this is clearly not the same 
type of apportionment the Court rejected in Ayers.  
Schadel also reasoned that “[t]he fact that the [Ayers] Court 
rejected a rule under which the railroad’s liability would be 
reduced by the negligence of third-party tortfeasors is of no small 
interest to us here, since that is exactly what IAIS wants—a 
reduction in its liability directly tied to Kowalewicz’s 
negligence.”119 Here, the Schadel court again oversimplifies the 
analysis, resulting in confusion over the purpose of a settlement 
credit. The negligence of a third party tortfeasor is not the basis for 
a court’s issuance of a settlement credit to the nonsettling 
defendant. Rather, the settlement of the third party forms the basis 
for the set-off. This distinction is made clear by the separate 
approaches the Supreme Court takes in AmClyde and Ayers.  
After discussing Ayers, the Schadel court explained why it felt 
AmClyde was not applicable to the FELA.
120
 The court’s 
justification for rejecting AmClyde is perplexing, to say the least. 
Schadel declined to follow AmClyde based on that case’s 
discussion of an earlier maritime case, Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique.
121
 In Edmonds, the Supreme Court 
rejected a shipowner’s request for a reduction in liability for the 
proportionate fault attributed to a stevedore whose liability was 
limited by the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s 
Compensation Act (LHWCA). Instead, the plaintiff in Edmonds 
was permitted to collect from the shipowner the entirety of his 
damages, after adjusting for the plaintiff’s own negligence.122 The 
AmClyde Court, in embracing the proportionate share set-off 
method, distinguished Edmonds for a very simple reason: the third 
party tortfeasor in Edmonds had not settled.
123
 Therefore, under the 
rule of joint and several liability, the shipowner was answerable for 
the entirety of the plaintiff’s damages. For this reason, the 
AmClyde Court held that Edmonds “merely reaffirm[ed] the well-
established principle of joint and several liability,” a doctrine that 
the Supreme Court emphasized is entirely consistent with the 
proportionate share set-off rule.
124
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Ironically, the Schadel court quoted this portion of AmClyde, 
discussing Edmonds, as grounds for rejecting the proportionate 
share rule.
125
 This justification is extremely puzzling. AmClyde’s 
statements regarding Edmonds illustrate exactly why AmClyde 
should control, not the other way around. The Schadel court’s 
explanation of AmClyde and Edmonds seems confused, to say the 
least. It seems that the Seventh Circuit was of the belief that the 
facts of Schadel made the case more akin to Edmonds than to 
AmClyde. But the exact opposite is true, and AmClyde itself 
explains why—“Edmonds did not address the issue in [AmClyde], 
the effect of a settlement on nonsettling defendants.”126 For this 
reason, the Supreme Court held that the rationale of Edmonds was 
not applicable to the Court’s calculation of settlement credits. The 
same logic illustrates why the rationale of  Ayers should not have 
controlled in Schadel. Like Edmonds, the Court’s opinion in Ayers 
“merely reaffirm[ed] the well-established principle of joint and 
several liability.”127 As AmClyde points out, joint and several 
liability does not prevent the application of a proportionate share 
set-off.
128
 The Schadel court suggested otherwise, evidencing an 
inherently flawed reading of AmClyde. 
C. Settlement is Different: The Bar on Contribution  
As discussed above, Ayers is not inconsistent with AmClyde. In 
fact, a better view is to look at Ayers and AmClyde as 
complementing each other; both cases adhere to the doctrine of 
joint and several liability as it applies to two entirely different 
circumstances. 
On the one hand, in the absence of a settlement, a defendant is 
not entitled to an initial allocation of fault to reduce his liability for 
the fault of other non-settling entities. Ayers makes clear that in 
this scenario, joint and several liability applies, allowing a plaintiff 
to recover the entirety of his damages from the FELA–Jones Act 
defendant. Ayers also makes clear that in this scenario, if the 
nonsettling defendant is found liable, he will be able to pursue a 
claim for contribution against negligent third parties who 
contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.129 
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On the other hand, if there has been a settlement, the 
nonsettling defendant is entitled to a proportionate share reduction 
for the settling tortfeasor’s responsibility. AmClyde makes clear 
that “there is no tension between joint and several liability and a 
proportionate share approach to settlements.”130 
The importance of adhering to this bifurcated analysis becomes 
clear when one considers the contribution rights that a nonsettling 
defendant possesses in each of the above scenarios. This is vital 
because Ayers recognizes that FELA–Jones Act defendants are 
entitled to spread liability to negligent third parties: “Once an 
employer has been adjudged negligent with respect to a given 
injury, it accords with the FELA’s overarching purpose to require 
the employer to bear the burden of identifying other responsible 
parties and demonstrating that some of the costs of the injury 
should be spread to them.”131  
When there has been no settlement, Ayers makes clear the 
nonsettling defendant can achieve this spreading of costs by 
seeking contribution from the negligent third party, who can be 
impleaded in the underlying FELA action.
132
 But when there has 
been a settlement, contribution will not be available to the FELA 
defendant looking to spread costs to a negligent third party who 
settled for less than its proportionate share. As a matter of law, 
once the negligent third party extinguishes his liability to the 
plaintiff through a settlement, the settling defendant will be 
immune from claims for contribution from the FELA defendant.
133
 
The same is true under the Jones Act.
134
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already settled. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(b) (McKinney 2010) 
(“A release given in good faith by the injured person to one tortfeasor as 
provided in subdivision (a) relieves him from liability to any other person for 
contribution as provided in article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules.”); 
see also Jean Macchioroli Eggen, Understanding State Contribution Laws and 
Their Effect on the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1701, 1707 
(1995) (surveying state approaches to contribution and concluding that the vast 
majority do not allow contribution actions against defendants who have already 
settled).  
 134. The Jones Act applies only to a seaman’s claim against his or her 
employer; “the seaman’s claim against others is governed by general maritime 
tort law, if the tort is maritime, or by state law.” FRANK L. MARAIST, THOMAS C. 
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Although the Seventh Circuit in Schadel purported to follow 
the rationale of Ayers, this bar on contribution illustrates that the 
pro tanto method is inconsistent with the Ayers Court’s emphasis 
that a jointly and severally liable FELA defendant will be afforded 
the opportunity to spread the costs of the plaintiff’s injury to other 
negligent third parties. Because a settling defendant is immune 
from claims for contribution, the pro tanto method makes it 
impossible for a nonsettling defendant to spread the costs to 
tortfeasors who have settled for less than their share of the 
damages.  
The Seventh Circuit in Schadel was seemingly unaware that 
such contribution actions are generally barred, for the court 
contended that the nonsettling defendant’s contribution rights 
presented a “far too complex” question that it expressly reserved 
“for another day.”135 Elsewhere in the opinion, the Seventh Circuit 
cited Ayers for the proposition that such contribution actions are 
allowed.
136
 This represents yet another example of Schadel’s 
misreading of Ayers and its confusion over the distinctions present 
in the settlement context. The Ayers Court did encourage FELA 
defendants to seek contribution from negligent third parties as a 
means of alleviating the burden of joint and several liability. But, 
Ayers did so in a scenario that did not involve settlement. When a 
negligent third party has settled with the plaintiff, such claims for 
contribution are generally not available.
137
 And because the Ayers 
                                                                                                             
 
GALLIGAN, & CATHERINE M. MARAIST, ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 248 (6th ed. 
2010). As discussed in supra note 133, under the majority state law rule, once 
the seaman settles with a defendant, that defendant is relieved from liability to 
other defendants for contribution. The rule is the same under the general 
maritime law. See AmClyde, 511 U.S. at 211–12 (holding that contribution 
actions against settling defendants should not be allowed, because allowing such 
actions would “discourage[] settlement and lead[] to unnecessary ancillary 
litigation”). 
 135. Schadel v. Iowa Interstate R.R., Ltd., 381 F.3d 671, 678–679 (7th Cir. 
2004). As discussed in supra note 133, in FELA cases, state law governs such 
actions for contribution. In spite of the Seventh Circuit’s comments, it seems 
clear that Illinois law (the applicable state law in Schadel) precluded the 
defendant railroad from recovering contribution from the settling defendant. See 
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/2(d) (West 2010) (“The tortfeasor who settles 
with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is discharged from all liability for any 
contribution to any other tortfeasor.”). 
 136. Schadel, 381 F.3d at 676 (“The [Ayers] Court was clear that [its 
prohibition of apportionment] did not preclude railroads from seeking 
contribution or indemnity from those other tortfeasors, ‘under otherwise 
applicable state or federal law,’ . . . but the railroad’s own responsibility was 
affected only by the plaintiff’s comparative negligence.”). 
 137. See supra note 133. 
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rationale hinged so heavily on the fact that FELA defendants are 
capable of spreading costs by impleading third parties, the analysis 
necessarily must change when the negligent third party has settled, 
as in Schadel.  
AmClyde’s proportionate share method of set-off solves this 
problem by providing an equitable method of spreading costs 
among responsible parties. Under this rule, a FELA or Jones Act 
defendant will be responsible for the plaintiff’s damages (including 
portions attributable to insolvent tortfeasors), subject only to 
reductions for the proportionate share of third parties with whom 
the plaintiff has settled. If the plaintiff reaches a favorable 
settlement with such third parties, the plaintiff will enjoy a 
windfall, for he will be able to collect from the nonsettling FELA 
defendant an amount greater than is required to make the plaintiff 
whole.
138
 Likewise, if the plaintiff agrees to an unwise settlement, 
he will suffer the loss, rather than the nonsettling defendant who 
was not a party to the settlement agreement. This provides an 
efficient and equitable method of sharing costs among responsible 
parties. For this reason, the spreading of costs by AmClyde’s 
proportionate share rule is consistent with Ayers, not barred by 
Ayers. 
D. The Remedial Purpose of the FELA Does Not Justify a Departure 
from AmClyde 
So far, this Article has critiqued Schadel based on that case’s 
inconsistency with prior Supreme Court precedent. But Schadel 
and its progeny have also justified their adoption of the pro tanto 
rule based on policy grounds—namely, the argument that the pro 
tanto rule is more consistent with the purposes of the FELA and 
the Jones Act. This Part discusses such policy arguments and 
concludes that the goals of the FELA and the Jones Act do not 
justify a departure from the Supreme Court’s decision in AmClyde.  
Illustrative of this policy approach is the Supreme Court of 
Ohio’s 2005 decision in Hess v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.139 
That case applied the pro tanto set-off method to a plaintiff’s 
asbestos claim under the FELA. In that case, the court discussed 
both Ayers and Schadel, but ultimately based its conclusion on 
policy grounds. The Hess court conceded that Ayers did not 
address the calculation of settlement credits.
140
 Likewise, Hess 
conceded that “a proportionate-share approach to settlements is not 
                                                                                                             
 138. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 221 (1994). 
 139. 835 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio 2005). 
 140. Id. at 689. 
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generally inconsistent with joint and several liability.”141 
Nevertheless, the Hess court applied the pro tanto rule. The court 
reasoned that a pro tanto set-off was more consistent with the 
objectives of FELA than the AmClyde approach.
142
 In enacting the 
FELA, “Congress was much more concerned with assuring the 
employee’s complete recovery than it was with fairness in loss 
allocation among multiple tortfeasors,” the Hess court 
contended.
143
 The court further reasoned that because the FELA 
guarantees “full recovery against a railroad whose negligence 
played only the slightest part in an employee’s injury or death, 
while providing for apportionment of responsibility only between 
employer and employee based on comparative fault, the statute 
plainly envisions that the employer may be forced to shoulder 
disproportionate liability when other parties are partially at 
fault.”144 
This rationale by the court in Hess, if nothing else, is refreshing 
for its candor. Unlike the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Schadel, the 
opinion in Hess makes perfectly clear that its holding is grounded 
on policy, not on precedent. However, the policy rationale applied 
in Hess does not justify a departure from the established Supreme 
Court precedent of AmClyde.   
Hess correctly points out that the principal policy objective of 
the FELA was to ease recovery for injured railroad employees by 
eliminating traditional common law defenses.
145
 However, the 
Hess opinion is somewhat misleading when it asserts that one of 
the policies embodied in the FELA is “ensuring full recovery 
against a railroad whose negligence played only the slightest part 
in an employee’s injury or death.”146 Although the doctrine of joint 
and several liability is certainly the rule in FELA cases, this policy 
is not found in the text of the FELA. Rather, because the FELA 
does not speak to the issue, courts have held that the FELA merely 
adopted the common law rule—joint and several liability.147  
Because the origin of such policy is not the FELA itself, but 
the common law, Hess went too far by adopting the pro tanto rule 
as a matter of FELA policy. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that because the FELA “is founded on common-law concepts 
of negligence and injury,” courts interpreting the FELA must lend 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See id. at 686–87; see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 
U.S. 532, 542–44 (1994) (discussing the history of the FELA). 
 146. Hess, 835 N.E.2d at 689 (emphasis added). 
 147. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135 (2003). 
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“great weight” to the common law rule, unless that rule is 
“expressly rejected in the text of the statute.”148 The same analysis 
applies under the Jones Act.
149
 The text of the FELA says nothing 
about joint and several liability, or about how damages should be 
divided between a settling defendant and a nonsettling defendant. 
In such a situation, the Supreme Court has made clear that judges 
should look to the common law for answers.
150
  
AmClyde and its proportionate share rule represent the clear 
federal common law approach for calculating settlement credits. 
AmClyde is the first and last time that the Supreme Court has 
spoken on the issue. AmClyde’s approach has since become the 
majority rule under both state and federal laws that still apply joint 
and several liability.
151
 This well-established rule should not be 
abrogated simply because of the FELA’s remedial purpose; as the 
Supreme Court has emphasized, although the FELA was drafted 
with a clear goal in mind, “[i]t does not follow, however, that this 
remedial purpose requires us to interpret every uncertainty in the 
Act in favor of employees.”152 Under the Supreme Court’s 
approach to interpreting the FELA, because the statute does not 
speak to the issue of third party liability or settlement credits, the 
remedial goals of the FELA and the Jones Act do not warrant an 
abrogation of the well-established common law rule of AmClyde. 
Therefore, in FELA and Jones Act cases, courts should apply the 
proportionate share method of set-off, rather than the pro tanto 
method. 
 
                                                                                                             
 148. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 544 (“Because FELA is silent on the issue of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, common-law principles must play a 
significant role in our decision.”); see also, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 
549 U.S. 158, 168 (2007) (“The fact that the common law applied the same 
causation standard to defendant and plaintiff negligence, and FELA did not 
expressly depart from that approach, is strong evidence against Missouri’s 
disparate standards.”); Monessen S.W. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 337–
38 (1988) (holding that, because FELA abrogated some common law rules 
explicitly but did not address “the equally well-established doctrine barring the 
recovery of prejudgment interest, . . . we are unpersuaded that Congress 
intended to abrogate that doctrine sub silentio.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Simeon v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 852 F.2d 1421, 1430 (5th Cir. 
1988) (“[W]e must construe the FELA, and hence the Jones Act, consistent with 
the common law, except where the statute explicitly departs from the common 
law or has been judicially construed to do so.”). 
 150. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 544; Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 168. 
 151. See sources cited supra note 7. 
 152. Sorrell, 549 U.S. at 171. 
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V. CONCLUSION: COURTS SHOULD REAFFIRM AMCLYDE AS THE 
PROPER RULE IN FELA AND JONES ACT CASES 
The debate over the best way to calculate settlement credits is 
not a new one. For many years, courts disagreed over whether the 
pro tanto rule or the proportionate share method provided the best 
set-off rule. But once the Supreme Court expressed its preference 
for the proportionate share method in AmClyde, the debate all but 
ended. Both state and federal courts joined the Supreme Court’s 
approach, embracing AmClyde as the general rule for calculating 
set-offs. 
But shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in the 
2003 case of Ayers, the debate was suddenly reignited. Even 
though Ayers did not speak to the set-off issue, the Seventh Circuit 
in Schadel held that the rationale of Ayers necessitated a different 
approach for FELA and Jones Act cases. Several other 
jurisdictions have agreed. These courts are in error. Their holdings 
are a result of a misreading of Ayers. Again, Ayers said nothing 
about calculating settlement credits, and ultimately, like Edmonds, 
“merely reaffirm[ed] the well-established principle of joint and 
several liability.”153 And as the Supreme Court has emphasized, 
“there is no tension between joint and several liability and a 
proportionate share approach to settlements.”154 Therefore, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ayers provides no justification for 
abrogating the well-established proportionate share set-off rule. 
As one prominent maritime scholar recently observed, after the 
Supreme Court adopted the proportionate share rule in AmClyde, 
“the legal system largely followed suit.”155 FELA and Jones Act 
cases should not be exceptions. In future FELA and Jones Act 
cases, courts should decline to adopt the Schadel approach, and 
instead adhere to the Supreme Court’s decision in AmClyde. 
 
                                                                                                             
 153. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220 (1994). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Sturley, supra note 107, at 526. 
